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VER From the Mineral Owner's
Perspective
By DEAN K.

HUNT*

MICHELE M. WHITTINGTON**

INTRODUCTION

A.

Overview of the Designation of Areas Unsuitablefor Mining
Provisions

Section 522 of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 19771 (hereinafter "SMCRA" or "the Act") establishes
congressional policies and procedures for the designation of
certain areas as unsuitable for all or certain types of coal mining. 2 The provisions of Section 522 evidence an attempt by
Congress to introduce an element of land use planning into
SMCRA, and thus to "respond to conflicts which often arise
between coal mining and other uses of the land." 3 As was noted
by the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:
The process for designation of land areas as unsuitable for
surface coal mining is . . .premised on the notion that suc* B.S. 1971, M.S. 1972, Engineering, Bucknell University; J.D. 1977, University
of Louisville. Mr. Hunt served with the United States Department of the Interior, Office
of Surface Mining from 1981-84, and is currently a partner in the Lexington, Kentucky
law firm of Stephens, Thomas & Hunt, P.S.C.
** B.A. 1983, Transylvania University; J.D. 1986, University of Kentucky. Ms.
Whittington is a partner with Stephens, Thomas & Hunt, P.S.C., Lexington, Kentucky.
I Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, §
522, 91 Stat. 507, (codified as 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (1988)). (hereinafter cited as SMCRA).
2 On the designation of areas unsuitable for surface coal mining requirements,
see Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 7 Before the
Subcommittee on Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 31 (1977) (letter from Frederick N. Ferguson,
Acting Solicitor, Department of the Interior); Dragoo, Designation of Coal Lands as
'Unsuitable' for Surface Coal Mining Operations, 27A ROCKY MTN. Mn . L. INsT., at
1-24 (1980); Squillace, Designating Areas Unsuitable for Surface Coal Mining, 1978
UTAH L. REV. 321; Prohibition of Surface Mining in West Virginia, 78 W. VA. L. REV.
445 (1976).
1 44 Fed. Reg. 14,989 (1979).
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cessful management of surface mining depends, in large part,
on the application of rational planning principles. While coal
surface mining may be an important and productive use of
land, it also involves certain hazards and is but one of the
many alternative land uses. In some circumstances, therefore,
coal surface mining should give away to competing uses of

higher

benefit.

4

The Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Office of

Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement ("OSM"), is required under SMCRA to develop the criteria and procedures
necessary to implement the unsuitability designation provisions.'
Section 522 contains several different methods for designat-

ing lands unsuitable for mining. The first, found in Section
522(c) 6, allows interested parties to petition the responsible regulatory authority 7 to designate an area as unsuitable for all or
some types of coal mining operations. Notice and an opportunity

for comment must be provided prior to reaching a determination
on such a petition.' If the regulatory authority determines that

"reclamation pursuant to the requirements of this Act are not

technologically and economically feasible," 9 it is required to
designate that area as unsuitable for all or certain types of
mining.' 0 In other cases, the regulatory authority has the discre-

tion to designate an area as unsuitable if certain criteria are
present." The second method of designation, found at Section

4

H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 94, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE

CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 593, 630.

SMCRA § 201(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c) (1988).
SMCRA § 522(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(c) (1988).
7 States wishing to assume primacy under SMCRA are required to develop the
necessary regulations to enable them to make unsuitability decisions consistent with the
provisions of SMCRA. SMCRA § 522(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a) (1988).
SMCRA § 522(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(c) (1988).
SMCRA § 522(a)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(2) (1988).
10Id.
11Section 522(a)(3) allows such a designation if the operation will: "(A) be incompatible with existing State or local land use plans or programs; or (B) affect fragile or
historic lands in which such operations could result in significant damage to important
historic, cultural, scientific, and aesthetic values and natural systems; or (C) affect
renewable resource lands in which such operations could result in a substantial loss or
reduction of long-range productivity of water supply or of food or fiber products, and
such lands to include aquifer recharge areas; or (D) affect natural hazard land in which
such operations could substantially endanger life and property, such lands to include
areas subject to frequent flooding and areas of unstable geology." SMCRA § 522(a)(3),
30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3) (1988).
6

1989-901

MINERAL OWNER'S PERSPECTIVE

522(b),' 2 requires the Secretary of the Interior to review federal
lands to determine whether any areas should or must be designated as unsuitable for mining under the criteria found in Section
522(a)(2) and (3).13
B.

Section 522(e) Areas Designated Unsuitable by Congress

The third type of unsuitability designation is found at Section
522(e) of SMCRA.' 4 Pursuant to these provisions, certain areas
of land were specifically identified by Congress as warranting
statutory designation of unsuitability for surface coal mining
operations. The reason for this provision was explained as follows:
Although the designation process will serve to limit mining
where such activity is inconsistent with rational planning in the
opinion of the [House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee],
the decision to bar surface mining in certain circumstances is
better made by Congress itself. Thus, section 522(e) provides
that, subject to valid existing rights, no surface coal mining
operation except those in existence on the date of enactment,
shall be permitted on lands within the boundaries of certain
Federal systems . . . or in other special circumstances...11
The Section 522(e) provisions contain five separate types of land
6
which are or may be designated unsuitable for surface mining.'

SMCRA § 522(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(b) (1988).
SMCRA § 522(a)(2), (a)(3), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1272 (a)(2) and (3) (1988).
SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (e) (1988).
'1 H.R.
REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. ADmN. NEws 593, 631.
SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988) prohibits, subject to valid existing
rights, mining on the following five categories of lands (known as "(e)(l) lands", etc.):
(1) on any lands within the boundaries of units of the National Park
System, the National Wildlife Refuge Systems, the National System of
Trails, the National Wilderness Preservation System; the Wild and Scenic
Rivers System, including study rivers designated under section 1276(a) of
title 16 and National Recreation Areas designated by Act of Congress;
(2) on any Federal lands within the boundaries of any national forest:
32

"

14

16

Provided, however, That surface coal mining operations may be permitted
on such lands if the Secretary finds that there are no significant recreational, timber, economic, or other values which may be incompatible with
such surface mining operations and
(A) surface operations and impacts are incident to an underground coal

mine; or
(B) where the Secretary of Agriculture determines, with respect to lands
which do not have significant forest cover within those national forests
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These provisions of Section 522 have generated a great deal

of controversy, and have been the source of litigation since the
passage of SMCRA. The first challenge came as a facial attack
on various provisions of SMCRA, including Section 522. The
Supreme Court rejected the constitutional challenges to these
provisions, concluding that the "mere enactment" of SMCRA
did not constitute a taking of private property in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. 7 Section 522(e) was specifically addressed
by the Court, which found that the requirements of Section
522(e) did not automatically deprive property owners of all
economically viable use of their property, since any restrictions
were subject to "valid existing rights."' 8 The Court did, however, leave open the possibility that a taking could be found
"with respect to specific property, and the particular estimates
of economic impact and ultimate valuation relevant in the unique

circumstances."19
C.

The Valid Existing Rights Exception to Section 522(e)
Central to the statutory designation of lands as unsuitable

for mining in Section 522(e) of SMCRA is the phrase "subject

west of the 100th meridian, that surface mining is in compliance with the
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 [16 U.S.C. §§ 528-311, the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, the National Forest Management Act of 1976, and the provisions of this Act: and provided further,
That no surface coal mining operations may be permitted within the
boundaries of the Custer National Forest;
(3) [surface coal mining operations] which will adversely affect any publicly
owned park or places included in the National Register of Historic Sites
unless apporved jointly by the regulatory authority and the Federal, State,
or local agency with jurisdiction over the park or the historic site;
(4) [surface coal mining operations] within one hundred feet of the outside
right-of-way line of any public road, except where mine access roads or
haulage roads join such right-of-way line and except that the regulatory
authority may permit such roads to be relocated or the area affected to lie
within one hundred feet of such road, if after public notice and opportunity
for public hearing in the locality a written finding is made that the interests
of the public and the landowners affected thereby will be protected;
(5) [surface coal mining operations] within three hundred feet from any
occupied dwelling, unless waived by the owner thereof, nor within three
hundred feet of any public building, school, church, community, or institutional building, public park, or within one hundred feet of a cemetery.
,7 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 295-96
(1981).
11Id. at 295 n. 37.
19Id. at 295.
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to valid existing rights" ("VER"). This phrase is of critical
importance to owners of minerals under the areas mentioned in
Section 522(e), since it allows surface coal mining operations to
be conducted on lands on which it is otherwise prohibited under
Section 522(e). Given the importance of this phrase to the determination of private property rights, the fact that Congress
chose not to define VER is particularly troublesome.
Although no definition of VER was included in SMCRA,
the language found in the legislative history is somewhat instructive of congressional intent. Of particular importance is the
discussion of VER found in the Senate Committee Report accompanying Senate Bill S. 7, which later became SMCRA. This
report noted:
The exception for 'valid existing rights' is intended to make
clear that the prohibition of strip mining on the national forests
is subject to previous state court interpretation of valid existing
rights. The language ... is in no way intended to affect or

abrogate any previous state court decisions. The party claiming
such rights must show usage or custom at the time and place
where the contract is to be executed and must show that such
rights were contemplated by the parties. The phrase "subject
to valid existing rights" is thus in no way intended to open up
national forest land to strip mining where previous legal pre20
cedents have prohibited stripping.

In addition to recognizing "previous state court"
interpretations 2' of VER, Congress further apparently included
the VER exception to avoid a taking of private property in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. This objective was noted in
Congressman Udall's opposition to an amendment that would
have deleted the VER exception. Congressman Udall stated that
the per se statutory prohibitions of SMCRA could not be im-

0 S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 94-95 (1977); As an example of a
previous court decision prohibiting mining, see United States v. Polino, 131 F.Supp. 772

(N.D. W.Va. 1955). In that case, the court prohibited strip mining of privately owned
coal underlying a federally owned surface in West Virginia's Monongahela National
Forest. See also, H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 96, reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 593, at 632 (1977).
2, Defining VER in terms of a person's property right in the coal resource, as
interpreted in accordance with state law, appears to be within the scope of the reasoning
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in NWF v. Hodel,
839 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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plemented without "paying compensation under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution" if the VER exception were
removed .22

One of the recurring questions in the evaluation of the
congressional intent of the VER exception concerns the use of
the term "valid existing rights" in SMCRA and the use of same
or similar terms in other federal laws. Some commentators have
asserted that, by its use of the term, Congress must have intended that the SMCRA definition of VER be the same as that
found in the other federal laws. After a thorough analysis of
the term's use in federal statutes generally, then law student
Monroe Jamison, in a Note written for the Journal of Mineral
Law and Policy, concluded that:
Congress was aware of the meaning of VER at the time the
Act was passed ... [N]ot only was the term used in three
separate Acts of Congress passed in the mid-1970s, it is also
currently found in over 100 statutes. This extensive congressional recognition strongly indicates that the legislature knew
what it was doing when it incorporated the term into SMCRA.
Between this current use and the extensive background of
interpretation of the term, VER can be referred to as having
23
a definite meaning.
However, despite the logic inherent in this assertion, OSM has
found the congressional intent regarding a VER definition to be
anything but clear. As a result, OSM's rulemakings on VER
have contained a wide range of definitions.
I.

REGULATORY TESTS FOR VALID EXISTING RIGHTS

Since 1979, OSM has made a number of unsuccessful attempts to define VER. Numerous methods of defining VER
have been proposed and, on two occasions, regulatory standards
were finalized. Both of these final definitions were later struck
down by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.24

123 CONG. REc. H12, 878 (daily ed. April 29, 1977); This statement is cited in
the preamble to the 1979 VER rule, 44 Fed. Reg. at 14,992 (1979) (citing incorrect CONG.
REC. reference).
21 Note, Regulation and Land Withdrawal: Defining "Valid Existing Rights," 3
J. MmN. L. & PoL'y 517, 544 (1988).
In Re: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 14 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1083 (D. D.C. 1980); In Re: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation (II), 620
F.Supp. 1519 (D. D.C. 1985).
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A third set of proposed standards was advanced by OSM, 25 but

was later withdrawn for further consideration. 26 It is interesting
to note that, as is demonstrated by the following discussion,
each successive proposed test for VER has differed greatly from
the one that proceeded it.
A.

The "All Permits Test"

The first attempt by OSM to define VER came in 1979. The
1979 test, which became known as the "all permits test," required an applicant to demonstrate that, as of August 3, 1977,
it possessed both the legal right to mine the coal and all necessary
permits required to conduct mining operations. 27 This test was
challenged by industry and was remanded to OSM by Judge
Flannery, who found the test to be too narrow. 28 Accordingly,
the "all permits test" was suspended by OSM "insofar as it
requires that all permits must have been obtained prior to August
3, 1977, in order to establish a valid existing right to surface
mine."

B.

29

The "Takings Test"

OSM's next rulemaking produced a VER test which was
completely different from the "all permits test." The 1983 test,
which became known as the "takings test," defined VER as
existing if the application of any of the Section 522(e) prohibitions would "effect a taking of the person's property which
would entitle the person to just compensation under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. .. ."30 This test was subjected to judicial scrutiny and was
remanded, for procedural reasons, to OSM for further rulemaking. 3

53 Fed. Reg. 52,374 (1988).
54 Fed. Reg. 30,557 (1989).
30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1979).
In Re: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 14 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1083, 1091 (D. D.C. 1980).
45 Fed. Reg. 51,547 (1980).
48 Fed. Reg. 41,312, 41,349 (1983).
, In Re: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig. (II),
620 F.Supp. 1519 (D.
D.C. 1985). The court found that the final definition differed so significantly from the
proposed rule that a new notice and comment period was necessary.
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The "Good Faith-All Permits Test"

The "good faith-all permits test" was derived by OSM from
the wording in Judge Flannery's 1980 opinion which struck down
the "all permits test." '3 2 Under this test, VER is defined in terms
of whether the applicant for VER had made a good faith effort
to obtain all necessary permits for a mining operation as of the
date the prohibition against mining came into effect. OSM first
utilized the "good faith-all permits test" after Judge Flannery
struck down the "all permits test" in 1980.1 3 This test was
revived through OSM administrative policy decisions after the
4
"takings test" was remanded in November of 1986.1
D.

The "Ownership and Authority Test"

The "ownership and authority test" was proposed as one of
the options for a VER definition in the December, 1988 rulemaking.3" Under this test, an applicant would be required to
prove that it possessed the right to mine by the method proposed
under the laws of the state in which the property was located.
As was previously noted, this test has not been implemented as
36
a final rule, since the proposed rule was withdrawn by OSM.
II.

ANALYSIS OF THE

VER

TESTS

With the exception of the "all permits test," each of the
VER definitions previously mentioned could resurface as a proposed rule in the future. Thus, each of these tests should be

32

In Re: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)

1083 (D. D.C. 1980). OSM fashioned this test from Judge Flannery's statement that "a
good faith attempt to obtain all permits before the August 3, 1977 cut-off date should
suffice for meeting the all permits test. Id. at 1091.
'3 45 Fed. Reg. 51,547 (1980).
3,The notice which suspended the "takings test" contained a statement by OSM
that it would again use the "good faith-all permits test" to make VER determinations
on federal lands pending completion of another rulemaking. 48 Fed. Reg. 41,952 (1986).
Additionally, the "good faith-all permits test" was implemented to make VER determinations on federal lands located in states whose regulations contained the "all permits
test." Id. This policy was subsequently extended by a series of "Temporary Directives"
issued by the director of OSM. OSM Temporary Directive 88-1 (January 25, 1988); OSM
Temporary Directive 89-16 (March 8, 1989); OSM Temporary Directive 90-03 (November
30, 1989).
31 53 Fed. Reg. 52,374 (1988).
36 54 Fed. Reg. 30,557 (1988).
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analyzed in light of the legislative history pertaining to VER and
the cases which have dealt with VER determinations.
A.

Analysis of the "Good Faith-All Permits Test"

Given the language contained in Judge Flannery's 1980 opinion regarding the "all permits test, ' 3 7 some have reached the
conclusion that the use of the "good faith-all permits test" is
mandated by the language of that opinion. Such a conclusion is
clearly not warranted when the court's language is read in con-

text, and when the applicable law is considered. 3"
Additional problems inherent in the use of the "good faithall permits test" were pointed out by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio in the Sunday Creek
Coal Co. v. Hodel decision.3 9 In that case, OSM had denied a
VER application using the "good faith-all permits test" under
Ohio law.4 The VER applicant had not made a "good faith
effort" to obtain all permits by August 3, 1977, but the deed
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
11What the court in fact said was that the government's argument in support of
the 1979 "all permits test" was inconsistent with the rule itself. That is, since the
government's rationale that the "all permits test" was in "consonance with the takings
cases" was incorrect, the regulation itself must be remanded, as it was based on an
erroneous and overly restrictive interpretation of the takings cases by OSMRE. Thus,
the court reasoned, the government's argument proved by its own terms that the rule
promulgated was arbitrary and capricious.
Significantly, the court expressed no disagreement with the government's underlyimg
premise in 1979, that the definition of VER should ensure "consonance with the taking
cases." However, since the court was not briefed on the issue of what would constitute
a "taking," and since it was not necessary for the court to reach this issue to render its
decision to strike down the "all permits test," the question of what VER definition
would ensure "consonance with the taking cases" was remanded to the Secretary for
further rulemaking.
The court's discussion of a "good faith effort to obtain all permits" amounted to
dictum, and as such, "is not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis
rule, even on courts inferior to the court from which the expression emanated, no matter
how often it may be repeated." 21 C.J.S. Courts § 190 (1940). Further, the statements
in an opinion "which constitute merely the reasoning, arguments, illustrations, and
analogies are generally not precedents." Id. It should also be noted that courts are not
rulemaking entities, and any such attempt by a court to impose such a rule would be
contrary to the division of power inherent in the U.S. Constitution. See Colorado Public
Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Hills, 420 F.Supp. 582 (D.C. Colo. 1976); Public
Service Comm'n. of the State of New York v. Federal Power Comm'n., 543 F.2d 757
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (a court may not compel an administrative agency to take a particular
course of action when another is open to it); Southport Rand & Commercial Co. v.
Udall, 244 F.Supp. 172 (D. C. Cal. 1965).
19Sunday Creek Coal Co. v. Hodel, No. C-2-88-0416 slip op. (S.D. Oh. June 2,
1988).
.' Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1501:13-3-02 (1988).
17
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under which the applicant sought to mine specifically permitted
surface mining methods to be employed. 4' The court ruled that
OSM had improperly limited the definition of VER to the "modified" or "good faith-all permits test," and that OSM was
required under law to interpret VER in such a manner as would
avoid a taking. As the court noted:
The OSMRE's adoption of a state standard which results in
the denial of virtually all applications for a determination of
valid existing rights is inconsistent with the congressional policy
under the SMCRA. The agency's action was not a reasonable
means of implementing the SMCRA and was arbitrary and
capricious.
[T]he OSMRE's adoption of the State of Ohio's standards for
the determination of valid existing rights deprived the plaintiff
of its property without just compensation in violation
of the
42
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Given the problems inherent in the "good faith-all permits test,"
it is questionable whether such a test could withstand additional
judicial scrutiny, should it be adopted by OSM.
B.

Analysis of The "Takings Test"

The "takings test" would probably be more capable of withstanding a court challenge than the "good faith-all permits test,"
since it has the advantage of being in accord with discussions
found in SMCRA's legislative history and, thus, appears to be
more consistent with congressional intent. For example, the view
that the purpose of the VER provision was to preclude interference with valid mining claims and, therefore, to insulate the
government from paying compensation, was discussed by Con43
gressman Udall and was reiterated by others.
Additionally, the "takings test" would appear to be in consonance with the findings of the Bureau of Mines, reported
during hearings on Senate Bill 7 and House Bill 2, which concluded that significant mining reserves would not be lost under
Id. at 1-2.
I'
,2 Id. at 8.
See 123 Cong. Rec. H12,878 (daily ed. April 29, 1977) (Remarks of Congressman
Udall, Remarks of Congressman Roncalio); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Energy and the Environment of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
on H.R.2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 113-14, 500-01 (February 28 and March 4, 1977).
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the unsuitability provisions of the proposed bills. This would
not be the case if VER were defined in a more restrictive manner,
such as the "good faith-all permits test."
The "takings test" was remanded to the Secretary by Judge
Flannery because of a procedural defect, and not because the
court found the test itself to be problematic." Thus, the "takings
test" does not suffer from the problems inherent in the "all
permits" or "good faith-all permits" test. Additionally, the
opinion of the court in Sunday Creek4l appears to support the
use of the "takings test" in the determination of the appropriate
definition of VER. It would therefore appear that the "takings
test" could be viewed as establishing the minimum standard,
consonant with the legislative history, for allowing mining in
Section 522(e) areas.
C.

Analysis of The "'Ownership and Authority Test"

The "ownership and authority test" seems to be in accord
with the cases cited in the legislative history of SMCRA pertaining to VER.46 Additional support for the adoption of this test
47
is found in the statements of then-Congressman Manuel Lujan,
which are viewed as evidence of his support for the "ownership
and authority test." During congressional debate on the surface
mining bill in the 95th Congress, Lujan stated:
Naturally, the bill's language is also subject to the corollary
that it is not intended to preclude mining where the owner of
the mineral has the legal right to extract the coal by surface
mining method.
Concerns in this area are not merely hypothetical. For example,

See supra note 31, and accompanying text.
Sunday Creek, supra note 39.
- The case of United States v. Polino, 131 F.Supp 722 (1955), was cited by the
legislative history as follows:
In this case the court held that 'stripping was not authorized by mineral
reservation in a deed executed before the practice was adopted in the
cournty where the land lies, unless the contract expressly grants stripping
rights by use of direct or clearly equivalent words. The party claiming such
rights must show usage and custom at the time and place where the contract
is to be executed and must show that such rights were contemplated by
the parties.
"

41

H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &

ADmN. NEws 593, 632 (1977).
47Congressman Lujan, now Secretary of the Interior, has the burden of attempting
to formulate a defensible definition of VER.
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in the establishment of the national forest system in many
areas of the country, grantors sold land to the United States
government for inclusion in a national forest system in many
areas of the country, but reserve mineral rights for themselves
and deeds of conveyance for which the United States was a
'party.' The language of Section 522(e) itself . . . is that en-

actment of this legislation does not disrupt the relationship
between the owner of the coal and the Federal Government.
I believe, therefore, that it would be contrary to the intention
of the Act, and a misuse of the Act, for the Forest Service (or
anyone else) to argue that the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act somehow modifies the relationship between
the owner of the surface and subsurface rights.
Clearly alienation by sale, assignment, gift, or inheritance of
the property right of the coal is not affected by the Act nor is
the legal right to mine the coal in any way4 8 modified if such
right existed prior to enactment of the Act.

III. THE UNSUITABILITY PROGRAM IN RELATION TO THE VER
TESTS

A.

View of the VER Tests In Relation to the Section 522(e)
Prohibitions

Regardless of the seemingly endless debate over what Congress actually meant by including the phrase "valid existing
rights" in SMCRA, the fact is that each interest group has
attempted to fashion some sort of congressional support for
their interpretation of VER from the legislative history. Those
who favor fewer restrictions on the mining of affected mineral
lands naturally advocate the VER tests which would allow such
mining operations to occur, and cite portions of the legislative
history to support their position. On the other hand, those who
wish to see little or no mining occur in the Section 522(e) areas
have pushed for regulations which would prohibit most surface
coal mining, and also attempt to support their position through
congressional intent.
The "ownership and authority test" is the VER test most
favored by mineral owners in general. The test would recognize
48 H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong.,
Ind Sess. 189, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. ADmrN. NEws 593, 718.
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otherwise valid property rights, and would reflect the legislative
history's apparent reliance on state property law, as in U.S. v.
Polino.4 9 The rationale under this analysis is that, if strip mining
was being practiced in the area in which the land in question is
located at the time of the severance, and if the acquiring federal
authority (such as the U.S. Forest Service) chose to purchase the
surface of the property without also purchasing the mineral
rights, then both the government and the mineral owner would
have had an expectation that strip mining might be practiced on
the area in question. Additionally, this test would be in accordance with Congressman Udall's concern that takings of private
property in violation of the Fifth Amendment should be avoided. 0
On the other hand, the "ownership and authority test" could
allow some mining within the boundaries of the National Park
System, which is contradictory to a stated goal of the U.S.
Department of the Interior." Additionally, the "ownership and
authority test," when considered alone, raises some questions
regarding the applicability of the Section 522(e)(3), (4) and (5)
prohibitions,5 2 since this test could be construed to render these
prohibitions to be moot in some instances.5
Application of the "good faith-all permits test" is generally
advocated by those who wish to preclude all mining within any
of the areas covered by the Section 522(e) prohibitions. It is
generally recognized that virtually no mining operations could
qualify for VER under the "good faith-all permits test."
However, the "good faith-all permits test" would virtually
ensure that the Section 522(e) prohibitions would result in a
number of takings of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The "good faith-all permits test" would also appear to
be contrary to SMCRA's legislative history by precluding all
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See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

,0 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
11See, e.g., 48 Fed. Reg. 6,912, 6,917 (1983) ("the inclusion of [a regulation
regarding Secretarial responsibility for VER determinations on federal lands] reflects the
Secretary's continuing commitment to carry out the Congressional mandate to protect
these areas and to ensure that there will be no mining on Federal lands in national
parks."); 51 Fed. Reg. 41,952 (1986) ("OSMRE will not process VER applications within
units of the National Park System until a Federal rule is finalized.")
52 SMCRA § 522(e)(3),(4),(5), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1272(e)(3), (4), and (5).
" For example, if the mineral owner could demonstrate the authority under state
property law to exercise his property rights under a publicly owned park, there would
apparently be no reason for such a plan to be "approved jointly" by the appropriate
federal and state authorities under SMCRA § 522(e)(3), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(3).
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mining within the national forests, even where the property
owner could meet the standards of U.S. v. Polino.54
The "takings test" is the test that appears to comport with
the language found in SMCRA's legislative history. Implementation of the "takings test" would allow limited surface mining
within the 522(e)(1) and (2) areas, but only after a showing that
the property owner met the standards of the "ownership and
authority test." Additionally, the applicant would be required
to demonstrate that there were no alternative means of mineral
recovery existing, such that a denial of the VER application
would result in a takings. This test would also be favored by
the mineral owners, but is not popular with those who wish to
place maximum restrictions on any such operations.
Application of the "takings test" has been criticized by some
state regulatory authorities, which feel that it would be difficult
to administer on a practical and theoretical level. 55 Additionally,
application of the "takings test" alone could also result in
mining being allowed within the National Parks in violation of
56
a stated objective of the Department of the Interior.
B.

Is There a Definition of VER That Will Satisfy the Objectives
of the Department and be in Compliance with SMCRA and
its Legislative History?

None of the tests for VER alone meet all of the stated
objectives of the Department (e.g., precluding mining in the
National Parks), while at the same time achieving compliance
with the dictates of SMCRA as indicated through its legislative
history.
This raises the question of whether a different definition of
VER could be applied to each of the different Section 522(e)
areas. The question is purely rhetorical, with the only reasonable
answer being no. There is no indication that Congress intended
different VER definitions for different types of lands. Thus,
although the adoption of different standards for the individual
Section 522(e) areas would be more likely to allow the policy
objectives of the various interested parties to be met, such a

131 F.Supp. 772 (N.D. W.Va. 1955).
As proposed in 1983, the "takings test" would require that the regulatory
authority make a case-by-case determination as to whether the application of the unsuitability provisions would result in a takings. 48 Fed. Reg. 41,312 (1983).
56 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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regulation would be unsupported by the legislative history, and
thus could not withstand judicial scrutiny. It therefore appears
that, to date, no definition of VER has been identified that will
satisfy the objectives of the Department of the Interior and will
be in compliance with SMCRA and its legislative history.
C.

Is There a View of the Unsuitability Program as a Whole
That Will Satisfy the Objectives of the Department and be
in Compliance with SMCRA and Its Legislative History?

As noted, there seems to be no proposed VER test which
would satisfy the objectives of the interested parties and which
could withstand judicial scrutiny. However, it is possible to look
beyond the confines of Section 522(e) and find alternative methods of satisfying these objectives. One example would be the
discretionary designation process found in the remainder of Section 522.11 The Department of the Interior could utilize the
discretionary designation process of Sections 522(a)-(d) to fully
designate the National Parks, and possibly other 522(e)(1) and
(2) areas, as unsuitable for mining. Such discretionary designations are not subject to the VER exception of Section 522(e),
thus avoiding the present controversy. The Director of the National Park Service, or the other appropriate agency, depending
upon the particular lands involved, could petition to have particular lands designated unsuitable for mining. The comment
period on such a discretionary designation could be held during
the same time period which is used for a proposed rule on VER.
This timetable would allow the Secretary to prohibit mining on
the selected properties while avoiding the necessity for making
any further VER determination on the designated areas.
Utilizing the discretionary designation process of Section
522(a)-(d) would alleviate the "political" pressure to adopt a
definition of VER that would not be in accordance with SMCRA
and its legislative history, but which would satisfy the objectives
of whichever group exerts the most pressure. Additionally, defining VER as provided for under the "takings test" or "ownership and authority test," when combined with the discretionary
designation of specific 522(e)(1) and (2) areas, would appear to
be in accordance with SMCRA and its legislative history, while

11See

supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
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at the same time allowing appropriate lands to avoid a positive
VER determination.
It thus appears that a comprehensive view of the SMCRA
unsuitability program as a whole, rather than a narrow view of
the Section 522(e) VER provisions in a regulatory vacuum, could
accomplish both the Department's policy objectives of precluding mining in certain areas, such as the National Parks, while
acknowledging valid property rights that existed on August 3,
1977. Mineral owners of areas designated unsuitable for mining
under the discretionary procedures of Section 522(a)-(d) would
have all the rights of administrative and judicial review found
in SMCRA, and would have certainty in relation to their mineral
holdings.

IV.
A.

THE MINERAL OWNER'S PERSPECTIVE

Mineral Owners Want Recognition of their Property Rights

As has been noted, the VER dilemma places the regulatory
authority in the position of being required to make tough decisions regarding mining in areas such as the National Parks in
the face of pressure from interest groups. In turn, the regulatory
authorities tend to deal with the problem by avoiding it; in other
words, to preclude decisions regarding the mining of private
holdings through bureaucratic delay tactics and through creative
interpretation of deeds or regulations. Such tactics are intolerable
to the mineral owners, and can most certainly be avoided. Mineral owners want to either be able to develop their property or
have a clear prohibition in place which is capable of quick
resolution by the regulatory agencies and the courts.
Most mineral owners believe that SMCRA should be read in
consonance with the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution so
that valid property rights are recognized. Accordingly, the "ownership and authority test" would appear to be the test most
closely tracking the interpretation of SMCRA perceived to be
most appropriate to the mineral owner.
B.

Mineral Owners Want VER to be Transferable

It is the very essence of a property right that such a right
must be capable of being transferred. If the owner of the mineral
rights under a protected tract of property can receive a positive
VER determination based upon his or her regulatory qualifica-
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tions, but cannot transfer those mineral rights to another, along
with the valid existing rights to mine that property, the property
rights are meaningless. From the mineral owner's perspective,
the proper test for VER must be whether a vested "right" to
mine the coal resource existed on the date the prohibitions came
into effect, and not whether the operator himself actually possessed those rights on that date.
Nontransferability of VER, which has been suggested by
some, would lead to absurdities in application. For example,
consider the case where a coal company's assets are sold in their
entirety to a second coal company-a rather common situation
in the coal business. If the VER to mine the purchased property
could not be transferred to a new owner, the right to mine
would be extinguished upon transfer. Thus, an operating mine
would have to be closed solely because of the transfer. Such a
result would clearly be absurd. Accordingly, whichever test for
VER is adopted, the transferability of that VER must be clearly
stated and recognized.
CONCLUSION

Given the confusion regarding the congressional intent as to
the meaning of the phrase "valid existing rights" in SMCRA,
as well as the political pressures placed on the Department of
the Interior, it is perhaps not surprising that the VER question
has not been resolved. In any case, however, the prolonged delay
in the promulgation of a legally defensible definition of VER by
OSM is most intolerable to mineral owners. OSM's failure to
take some sort of definitive action to establish its position on
the VER question places the mineral owner in a regulatory limbo
from which he cannot escape. Given the current state of affairs,
the mineral owner's property rights are effectively rendered valueless, since no one knows, at this point, whether or not they
will be able to be exercised at some point in the future. It is
essential that OSM proceed with the adoption of some rule,
whether it be the tests favored by the mineral owners or another
test, so that the process of judicial review and resolution of this
troubling issue can proceed. It is critical that mineral owners be
given some resolution to this regulatory void, and that a regulatory program be implemented that will specifically delineate
the areas where mining will and will not be allowed. Quite
simply, thirteen years is too long to wait for an answer to the
VER question.

